We examine a situation that n eavesdroppers attack the Bennett-Brassard cryptographic protocol via their own optimal and symmetric strategies. Information gain and mutual information with sender for each eavesdropper are explicitly derived. The receiver's error rate for the case of arbitrary n eavesdroppers can be derived using a recursive relation. Although first eavesdropper can get mutual information without disturbance arising due to other eavesdroppers, subsequent eavesdropping generally increases the receiver's error rate. Other eavesdroppers cannot gain information on the input signal sufficiently. As a result, the information each eavesdropper gains becomes less than optimal one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is one of the major applications of quantum information theories [1, 2] While other applications such as quantum teleportation and quantum computer require tens or even thousands of qubits, the quantum cryptography scenario such as BB84 protocol [3] can be implemented, at least theoretically, using only single qubit technology. This is main reason why the quantum cryptography based on BB84 or Ekert91 [4] is now at the stage of the industrial era [5] .
According to the usual BB84 protocol the sender (Alice) sends a single qubit to the receiver (Bob) by choosing randomly one of the conjugate bases {|x , |y } and {|u , |v },
Then Bob performs a quantum mechanical measurements in these bases. After measurements, Alice and Bob communicate with each other via classical public channel and establish a secret quantum key by using only those cases in which the bases of Alice and Bob coincide.
How much information an eavesdropper (Eve) can gain when Alice and Bob perform the usual BB84 scheme? The answer of this question is important to check the security of the quantum cryptography. In this reason many authors examined the various strategies with one-and two-dimensional probes [6, 7, 8, 9] . Among them Ref. [9] derived the optimal (or maximal) mutual information between Alice and Eve as a function of the disturbance D in the BB84 protocol. The final result can be summarized as follows:
where I xy (or I uv ) is the optimal mutual information when Alice sends a signal to Bob via x − y (or u − v) basis, and φ(z) = (1 + z) log 2 (1 + z) + (1 − z) log 2 (1 − z). The constants D xy and D uv denote the disturbances in these bases. The most different point of the quantum cryptography from the classical one is the fact that Eve cannot get information from the trusted parties without arising the disturbance. This implies that the quantum scheme is more secure than the classical cryptography.
Recently, many different cryptographic protocols have been studied from the purely theoretical ground (at least at current stage) even if most quantum cryptography has been demonstrated by making use of either one of BB84 or Ekert91 protocols. One of the moti- vations for searching other protocols is to strength the security against eavesdropping. The simple extended protocol is a six-state protocol [10, 11] . In this protocol Alice sends a signal to Bob after choosing randomly one of three conjugate bases {|x , |y }, {|u , |v } and {|w , |z }, where
The basis {|w , |z } corresponds to the circular polarization if Alice and Bob use a photon polarization as a qubit. The optimal mutual information between Alice and Eve is plotted in Fig. 1 , which implies that the six-state protocol is more secure than usual four-state BB84 against eavesdropping. Another extended protocol [12, 13, 14, 15] is that Alice and Bob use qutrit (d = 3) or more generally qudit (d = 4, 5, · · · ) instead of a qubit. The optimal mutual information in this protocol is also plotted in Fig. 1 when d = 3, 4, and 5. Fig. 1 indicates that the protocol with d-level system is more secure against eavesdropping with increasing d.
Furthermore, the quantum cryptography with continuum [16] and noisy states [17] are under investigation. However, all of these other protocols seem to be far from embodiment in a few years from the aspect of experimental science.
In this paper we would like to explore the situation where many eavesdroppers (Eve1, represent the optimal strategy when Alice sends a signal using x − y or u − v basis respectively.
The bottom two lines belong to Eve and the top line to Alice. Time advances from left to right.
Eve2, · · · ) attack the BB84 protocol optimally. We assume that all of the eavesdroppers think they are unique eavesdropper. Our computation is based on the quantum circuit expression of the optimal eavesdropping strategy [18] . This paper is organized as follows. In section II we review Ref. [18] briefly. In this section we develop a computational technique, which is useful when many eavesdroppers try to attack optimally. In section III we examine the situation where Eve1 and Eve 2 attack the usual BB84 protocol. Information gain G and Eve2 respectively. When Eve1 and Eve2 attack via symmetric optimal strategy, we compute the Bob's error rate or disturbance D B,2 explicitly, where the subscript "2" denotes the two eavesdroppers. It turns out that both optimal strategies fail. Although Eve1 can gain information on Alice's signal as much as possible, Eve2 increases the disturbance or Bob's error rate. For Eve2 she cannot gain information sufficiently due to Eve1's disturbance.
In section IV we examine the situation where three eavesdroppers attack the BB84 protocol. The mutual information for each eavesdropper is analytically derived. Furthermore, Bob's error rate D B,3 is also explicitly derived on condition that all eavesdroppers use the symmetric strategies. In section V we have generalized the results of the previous sections.
When n eavesdroppers attack, the mutual information for each eavesdropper is analytically derived. Also the recursive relation of the Bob's error rate is derived. It turns out that all optimal strategies eavesdroppers choose eventually fail except very rare cases. Finally a brief concluding remark is given.
II. ONE EAVESDROPPER
The quantum circuits for the optimal eavesdropping in x − y and u − v bases are given in Fig. 2 . The top line belongs to Alice and Bob, and the bottom two lines to Eve. In order to perform the optimal eavesdropping strategy Eve prepares the initial states as following:
where ∆ and D are related, when they have same subscripts, through the formula
If Alice sends a signal using x−y basis, Fig. 2 (a) shows that the entangled states between
Alice and Eve becomes
For later use it is necessary to express Eq.(2.3) more compactly. This can be achieved by
where |j 2 and |j 4 means |j modulo 2 and |j modulo 4 . Thus |j 2 and |j 4 represents the one-and two-qubit states respectively with ordering x and y for |j 2 and xx, xy, yx and yy for |j 4 . This compact notation will be usefully used in the following sections when many eavesdroppers attack.
When Alice sends a signal using u − v basis, the usual control-NOT gate changes |uu → |uu |uv → |vv |vu → |vu |vv → |uv . 
For our case the complete set of the positive operators is {E 0 , E 1 , E 2 , E 3 } with E 0 = |xx xx|, E 1 = |xy xy|, E 2 = |yx yx|, and E 3 = |yy yy|. Then it is easy to compute P λi = I|1 1 ⊗ E λ |I with I = X or Y and i = x or y, which is the probability that Eve detects outcome λ when Alice sends a signal i:
(2.8)
Using Eq.(2.8), one can compute q λ = (1/2)(P λx + P λy ) and Q iλ = (1/2)P λi /q λ :
and
The quantity q λ is a probability that Eve has outcome λ when Alice uses x − y basis. The quantity Q iλ is posterior probability on the Eve's guess after she has a outcome λ. Then the information gain is defined as G λ = |Q xλ − Q yλ |, which, for our case, is λ-independent:
Thus, the mutual information I AE between Alice and Eve reduces to
Now, let us derive the Bob's error rate, usually called disturbance when Alice sends a signal using the x − y basis. First, we consider the following quantities:
These are probabilities Bob gets a wrong result conditioned upon Alice sending |u or |v , and Eve measuring λ. Computation of d λu and d λv is straightforward. The result is that d λu is identical to d λv and they are also λ-independent as follows:
Then the Bob's error rate D B is given by
Thus Eq.(2.12) can be re-written as
which is the optimal mutual information derived in Ref. [9] when Alice sends a signal using
x − y basis. If Alice uses u − v basis, we should repeat the previous calculation using Fig. 2 give an optimal information to Eve regardless of the basis Alice is using.
III. TWO EAVESDROPPERS
Now we consider a situation that two eavesdroppers, Eve1 and Eve2, attack the usual BB84 protocol. We assume that Eve1 and Eve2 do not know each other and they use their own optimal strategies. Thus corresponding quantum circuit should be Fig. 3 when Alice sends a signal using x − y basis. From now on we will use the superscript (i) to distinguish the quantities (or states) which belong to Eve1 and Eve2.
Using the compact notation used in Eq.(2.5), one can derive the entangled states at the stage represented as a dotted line in Fig. 3 :
In order to derive the POVM elements for Eve1 we construct the operator
x − ρ 
λ for Eve1 and G (2) λ for Eve2 turn out to be λ-independent as following:
(λ = 0, 1, 2, 3) (3.6)
Therefore from a comparison of Eq.(3.6) with Eq.(2.11) Eve1 seems to be able to get information as much as the case of unique eavesdropper. This is due to the fact that Eve1 attacks the BB84 protocol earlier than Eve2 and therefore, gathers information without perturbation arising due to Eve2. However, this does not mean that Eve1's optimal strategy is succeeded. As shown in Fig. 1 optimality of the eavesdropping does not uniquely depend on the quantity of information that eavesdropper can gain. In order to get success in the eavesdropping, eavesdropper should decrease the disturbance as much as possible. These two factors, increase of information gain and decrease of disturbance, determine the success or failure of the optimal strategy. As will be shown shortly, Eve1's optimal strategy fails because Eve2 increases Bob's error rate. For Eve2 the information gain involves an interesting factor 1 − D
xy . Thus Eve2's information gain depends on the Eve1's choice of D
xy . This is manifestly due to the fact that Eve2 performs her optimal strategy after Eve1. If Eve1 chooses D uv . This indicates that Eve2 can increase her information gain if Eve1 does not disturb the signal Alice sent to Bob. The mutual information I AE 1 and I AE 2 reduce to
Now, let us turn into the Bob's error rate. Unlike the unique eavesdropper case discussed in the previous section the situation is very complicated. In this case it could happen that Eve1's disturbance and Eve2's successive disturbance does not generate an error to Bob. needs long and tedious calculation, we will try to make the situation more simple.
To make the situation more simple we assume that both eavesdropping strategies are symmetric, i.e. D
(1)
uv and D
uv . In this case we can compute the Bob's error rate directly from the entangled states Eq. (3.1), which is (Fig. 4(a) ) and I AE 2 ( Fig. 4(b) ). The dotted line is a D B -dependence of the optimal strategy derived in Eq.(1.2). The monotonically decreasing line corresponds to I AB , mutual information between Alice and Bob. Fig. 4 (a) implies that the mutual information of Eve1 is less than the optimal one except D (2) = 0. This is due to the fact that Eve2's eavesdropping process generally increases the Bob's error rate. Fig. 4(b) implies that the mutual information of Eve2 is also less than the optimal one except D (1) = 0. This is due to the fact that Eve1's eavesdropping process generally decreases the information gain for Eve1. Fig. 4 is D B -dependence of I AE 1 (Fig. 4(a) ) and I AE 2 (Fig. 4(b) ). We plot I AE 1 in Fig. 4 (a) when D (2) = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 respectively. For comparison we plot the optimal information I opt (see Eq.(1.2)) and mutual information I AB between Alice and Bob defined
together. As Fig. 4(a) indicates, Eve1's mutual information with Alice are in general smaller 2) approaches to zero, I AE 1 approaches to I opt . This means that failure of the Eve1's optimal strategy is only due to the fact that Eve2 increases the disturbance. We plot I AE 2 in Fig. 4 (1) . This seems to be mainly due to the fact that Eve2's information gain is affected by Eve1 as shown in Eq.(3.6).
In Fig. 5 we plot I AE 1 and I AE 2 together as functions of D (1) and D (2) . In most region region I AE 2 becomes larger than I AE 1 because this multiplication factor becomes nearly unit in this region.
I AE 1 is larger than I AE 2 . This is also due to the D (1) -dependence of Eve2's information gain
λ . In the small D (1) region, however, I AE 2 becomes larger than I AE 1 . This is due to the fact that Eve1 cannot gain information without increasing D (1) as Eq.(3.6) indicates.
IV. THREE EAVESDROPPERS
In this section we consider a situation that three eavesdroppers called Eve1, Eve2, and Eve3 attack the usual BB84 protocol. As previous section we assume that they think they are unique eavesdroppers and choose their own symmetric strategies. Thus corresponding quantum circuit should be Fig. 6 when Alice sends a signal using x − y basis.
Using the compact notation used in Eq.(2.5), one can derive the entangled states at the stage represented as a dotted line in Fig. 6 . The final result becomes
Then, it is straightforward to construct the complete sets of the positive operators for eavesdroppers' POVM measurements. Following the similar calculational procedure, one can compute the information gain for each eavesdropper. The final result can be summarized as following:
Note that we remove all subscripts because they are not necessary in the symmetric strategy.
Eq.(4.2) exhibits a simple pattern: the information gain for each eavesdropper is a multiplication of her own 1 − 2∆ factor with 1 − 2D factor of other eavesdroppers who perform their own strategies earlier. Using this rule, we can compute the information gains when n eavesdroppers attack with arbitrary number n without explicit calculation. The mutual informations I AE 1 , I AE 2 and I AE 3 reduce to
Finally Bob's error rate D B can be read straightforwardly from Eq.(4.1):
. (Fig. 7(a) ), I AE 2 ( Fig. 7(b) ), and I AE 3 ( Fig. 7(c) ).
The optimal mutual information I opt and Bob's mutual information I AB are plotted together for comparison. This figure indicates that all optimal strategies performed by Eve1, Eve2, and Eve3 turn out fail. Fig. 7 is the plot of D B -dependence of I AE 1 (Fig. 7(a) ), I AE 2 ( Fig. 7(b) ), and I AE 3
( Fig. 7(c) ). We fixed D the optimal mutual information I opt and Bob's information I AB are plotted together. As Fig. 7 indicates, all optimal strategies turn out to fail. Especially, Eve3 gains very little information compared to optimal one. This is mainly due to the fact that Eve1 and Eve2 disturb the Alice's signal before Eve3 starts her optimal strategy. Comparision of Fig. 7 with Fig. 4 indicates that mutual informations in the case of three eavesdroppers are overall less than those in the case of two eavesdroppers. This seems to be due to the fact that Eve3's disturbance of Alice's signal decreases I AE 1 and I AE 2 in the disturbance-information diagram.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined the situation that many eavesdroppers attack usual BB84 protocol via their own symmetric optimal strategies. If the number of eavesdroppers is arbitrarily n as shown in Fig. 8 , Eq.(2.11), (3.6) and (4.2) imply that their information gains are
and their mutual informations with Alice are It seems to be of interest to extend our results to the case of asymmetric eavesdropping.
Probably it needs very long and tedious calculation. Furthermore, asymmetric eavesdropping strategy may be not important practically because Alice and Bob can notice the presence of eavesdropper more easily than the symmetric case. However, from the purely theoretical point of view it is interesting issue because it may give origin of information gain and Bob's error rate.
Although much attention has been paid to the optimal strategy in the various protocol, the properties of the non-optimal case are not examined sufficiently. Since, however, the effect of decoherence makes it impossible for eavesdropper to perform the exactly optimal one, it seems to be more important to explore the strategies near to optimal from the aspect of the practical reason. Recently, it is found [20] that the quantum resonance occurs in the Bob's error rate when Eve takes a near-optimal strategy. We believe that there are other new and interesting properties in the eavesdropping strategies near to optimal one. We would like to explore this issue in the future.
